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Background
o Rapid growth of electrical system size and weight
o Aerospace industry evolved new requirements
- Smaller conductors and thinner insulation films
- Higher temperature insulation materials
- improved abrasion resistance
o Kapton has high temperature rating and good abrasion
resistance
o New failure modes introduced but not recognized
- Conductive char formation
- Energy density of harnesses increased
o Fly by wire vehicles raise the criticality of the
electrical system
o Arc-tracking facts:
- Two kinds: wet and dry
- Requires an Initiating event (i.e., Insulation damage)
- Not a combustion process
- An extended Ignition source (time and space)
- Failure can cascade through a harness (flashover)
- Flashover can fail an entire harness
- Failure propagates rapidly
- Conventional circuit protection does not prevent
- Substantial failure history in DOD (500+) and
NASA (5+) arc propagating events
- Use of Kapton wire has been severely restricted
by many agencies
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Shuttle Status
o NASA HQ investigation concluded that the risk of Kapton arc-
tracking_lashover is a credible threat to the orbiter
- Risk of another arcing event over life of program is high
- Risk of loss of mission/early return is moderate
- Risk of loss of vehicle is at least an order of magnitude less
than risk resident in the propulsive elements
o Risk can be substantially lessened
- Orbiter not originally engineered with consideration for
these failure modes
- Maintenance and inspection can compensate for many
shortcomings
o Pre-STS-26 rationale not valid
- Depended on four fundamental elements
Aerospace quality wire Installation will preclude
wire damage
Physical protection installed in high traffic areas
Circuit protection will prevent damage propagation
Redundancy separation will preclude crit I events
o Detailed review of rationale revealed the following:
Quality of wire installation and maintenance:
Shuttle built to 1970's "aerospace Standard" & did not
account for arc-tracking/flashover failure modes
Wire damage and short circuits fairly common
Most damage not due to negligence
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Status (cont)
- Physical protection installed in high traffic areas:
Level of effort reflected low credibility of threat
Rubber pads used to crawl on wiring in ECLSS bay
Some convoluted tubing applied at high traffic points
Sheetmetal cable covers installed on VESS
Other protection defined but not implemented
- Circuit protection to prevent damage propagation
Not designed to detect/prevent arcing
Resistance to inadvertent tripping is critical
JSC Orbiter breadboard shows ineffective for
28 volt DC events
JSC data inconclusive for 115 volt AC events
ST,S-6 event was in AC harness & destroyed harness
- Redundancy separation of critical functions precludes
Crit I events
Requirements allowed exceptions In certain areas
These exceptions not recorded or tracked
FMEA/CIL review of wiring deleted from program
JSC testin_o and fli_aht exDerlence have demonstrated that
failure Dropa_aation canresult in loss of an entire harness
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Rationale for Flight
o Rationale adequate for continued flight for time being
- Wiring generally well installed and maintained
- Physical protection installed at highest risk locations
- Additional protection being Installed as practical
- Training and hardware inspection highlight concerns
- Flight rules preclude resetting tripped circuit breakers
- Small number of crit I harnesses and low risk of crit 1
event
- Continued attention required to control risk
- Risk is unacceptably high for inclusion in new builds
Testing/Research
o NASA development of new Insulation materials is not practical
o Improved understanding of insulation material properties in a
systems level context is critical
o New testing programs address NASA requirements:
- WSTF program to determine minimum energy level to sustain
arc-propagation in MIL-W 81381 (Kapton) wire
4 watts for 26 awg wire
8 watts for 20 awg wire
- WSTF program to determine physics-based limits of Insulation
resistance to arc-propagation
- Analytical math model development (Battelle)
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Recommendations for Shuttle
o Increase emphasis on mitigating this risk
o Physical protection must be stressed
O
O
- Add protection where logical before damage is noted
Thorough, dedicated inspections should continue regularly
Redundancy and its limits should be understood:
- Cdt I harnesses should be identified
- re-routing/replacement when practical
- Special inspection/protection when not
- Should understand downmoding to crlt I harnesses when
all remaining redundancy is in one harness
Recommendations for Station
O
O
Do not use Kapton wire (MIL-W 81381) for any power circuits
Do not ban the use of Kapton
- May be ideal for low power signal wires
- OK for use as structural applications such as solar array
blankets
. Flexible circuits have shown susceptibility to arc-tracking
- Kapton may be safely used in correctly designed hybrid
wire constructions (i.e., TKT) to improve abrasion resistance
o Electrical systems should be designed to preclude arc-
propagation regardless of insulation matedai
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Conclusions
o Arc-propagation poses a significant and credible threat to
mission safety and success in aerospace vehicles
o Wire construction has a significant Impact on the probability
of arc-propagation
- Resistance to damage
- Formation of conductive char
o If permitted, arc-propagation can result in the failure of any
wire bundle above a critical energy potential
- includes primary power cabling if bundled with returns
o Station should be designed to tolerate reasonable levels of
wire damage without failure propagation to adjoining wires
o Kapton (MIL-W 81381) wire or its equivalent should not be
utilized in new builds for power applications
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